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1. Introduction 
Since 2007, European countries have been in the throes of an economic crisis, with the 
destruction of jobs reaching levels not seen in many decades. Although there is some 
heterogeneity across Europe with respect to the severity of the crisis, most European 
countries have had quite low GDP growth rates since 2008; these rates were even 
negative in some cases. This low growth was maintained until 2014 (World 
Development Indicators, World Bank). Several researchers have suggested that this low 
growth has had socio-demographic consequences and significant costs. In contrast to 
other countries, such as the US, where GDP growth recovered earlier, reaching rates of 
approximately 2 since 2010 (World Development Indicators, World Bank), the long 
period of recession observed in Europe can be a good framework for studying the social 
effects of the economic crisis. Even the media paid attention to the impact of these 
economic problems on a variety of factors, such as marital dissolution, in some 
European countries. For example, the New York Times highlighted the negative impact 
of Spain’s ‘Great Recession’ on the probability of divorce.1 This observation is by no 
means an isolated case, and we have undertaken to explore whether variations in the 
business cycle do effect marital dissolution decisions.2 
 We are not the first researchers to study the relationship between fluctuations in 
the business cycle and divorce. However, most of the (somewhat sparse) economic 
literature examining the relationship between the business cycle and divorce has 
focused on the US (Amato and Beattie, 2011; Baghestani and Malcolm, 2014; 
Hellerstein and Morrill, 2011; Schaller, 2013). Fewer studies have investigated this 
issue in other countries, but some examples include the papers published by Jensen and 
Smith (1990) for Denmark, Fischer and Liefbroer (2006) for the Netherlands, and 
Ariizumi et al. (2015) for Canada. In our case, we add to the literature by examining this 
issue for a panel of 29 European countries.  
For a theoretical overview of this topic, we initially focus on Gary Becker’s 
earlier work, in which he suggested that married individuals separate when the expected 
utility in the situation of divorce, or even in a potential remarriage situation, is greater 
                                                 
1 “Hard Times in Spain Force Feuding Couples to Delay Divorce,” The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/world/europe/hard-times-in-spain-force-feuding-couples-to-delay-
divorce.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& 
2 In the literature, it is possible to find several potential determinants of divorce (e. g., unilateral divorce 
reforms (Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006), Child Custody and Child Support laws (González-Val and 
Marcén, 2012a), price stability (Nunley, 2010) and culture (Furtado et al., 2013), among others). 
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than the expected utility from remaining married (Becker et al., 1977). In that 
framework, male job losses reduce the gains derived from marriage, thus increasing the 
probability of divorce. Then, since the empirical evidence points to a greater negative 
effect of the economic crisis on male employment than on female employment (Hoynes 
et al. 2012), we would expect a positive relationship between unemployment rates and 
divorce rates. Nevertheless, when marriage is considered to be insurance against 
economic problems, it should be expected that the greater the unemployment rate, the 
lower the divorce rate (Shore, 2009; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007). These studies 
propose opposite effects, as outlined by Ariizumi et al. (2015). Using a theoretical 
model, Ariizumi et al. (2015) explained that the probability of divorce could increase or 
decrease when unemployment rates rises. The sign of the effect depends on the balance 
of the impacts of the economic crisis on the gains derived from marriage and on the 
quality of those individuals without partners with whom divorcees may potentially 
match. 
Other possible theoretical alternatives could explain the impact of the business 
cycle on divorce; for example, Amato and Beattie (2011) explored three perspectives: 
the psychosocial stress perspective, the cost-of-divorce perspective, and the hybrid 
perspective. The first perspective suggests that the loss of a job produces psychosocial 
stress, which can affect divorce decisions. According to those authors, the effect should 
be greater when the variables are lagged, as the stress of decreasing employment 
opportunities takes time to affect marital dissolution. The second alternative, the cost-
of-divorce perspective, points to an inverse relationship between unemployment and 
divorce because divorce can be a costly process and a job loss situation generates 
economic constraints. In contrast to that observed in the US, a priori, this perspective 
could be less relevant due to the greater generosity of the welfare systems in most 
European countries (Alesina et al. 2001), since this can reduce the effects of economic 
downturns on households. The last perspective combines the other two perspectives; in 
this case, the unemployment rate should be negatively associated with the divorce rate 
when both rates are measured in the same year, as divorce costs would drive 
contemporary divorces, and positively associated with the divorce rate when the divorce 
rate is measured in subsequent years, as psychosocial stress increases over time. As 
noted, these theoretical perspectives do not indicate an a priori clear relationship 
between business cycle variations and divorce. 
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Few papers have developed empirical work to investigate which, if any, of these 
alternative explanations is dominant. The initial work on this issue concluded that 
divorce rates behave in a pro-cyclical manner (Ogburn and Thomas, 1922; Stouffer and 
Spencer, 1936; Kirk and Thomas, 1960). Similar results were obtained in more recent 
studies using state-level or individual-level data for the US (Baghestani and Malcolm, 
2014; Hellerstein and Morrill, 2011; Amato and Beattie, 2011; Hellerstein et al., 2013; 
Schaller, 2013). There is one exception: South (1985) found small positive effects of 
unemployment on the divorce rate using national-level data for the US. For other 
countries, Fischer and Liefbroer (2006) showed a negative effect of consumer 
confidence on divorce rates in the Netherlands, and in the case of Denmark, Jensen and 
Smith (1990), used panel data for married couples to conclude that unemployment is a 
relevant factor in marital instability. Their findings point to an immediate positive effect 
of male unemployment on divorce. No impact of unemployment on divorce could be 
found in the analysis of the Canadian case (Ariizumi et al., 2015). It is then reasonable 
to state that the empirical results are mixed. 
In our work, we utilize European data on divorce rates from 1991 to 2012, which 
were measured at the country level. Divorce is defined as the final legal dissolution of 
marriage as authorized by the laws of each country. In Europe, as in the states of the 
US, no common divorce law exists across countries, although since the 1970s, most 
European countries have passed divorce law reforms that make these laws more 
homogenous (González and Viitanen, 2009; González-Val and Marcén, 2012b; Furtado 
el al., 2013). However, some of these laws are much more complex and restrictive than 
the laws that regulate divorce issues across the US, which can increase divorce costs 
and make divorce quite difficult under the economic constraints that an unemployment 
situation can generate. The differences from the US legislation are remarkable; for 
example, there are large differences in the separation period requirements for obtaining 
a divorce when there is not an agreement between the spouses. In the United Kingdom, 
a five-year separation period is needed for the spouse who wants a divorce if his/her 
spouse does not consent to that divorce. Under these circumstances, divorce decisions 
are more difficult than in other countries, such as the US, where in most states, 
unilateral divorce is not so restrictive (Friedberg, 1998).  
Following prior studies, we use information about national unemployment rates 
during the same period to measure variations in the business cycle. Although from a 
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theoretical point of view, the relationship between unemployment and divorce is not 
clear, our results suggest that the divorce rate and the unemployment rate are negatively 
associated, even after including controls for unobservable characteristics that can vary at 
the country level and/or over time and controls for other characteristics that are 
measured at the country level, such as cultural differences, changes in population 
composition, differences in the generosity of cash benefits or even the participation of 
women in the labor force. The results are also unchanged when we use different sub-
samples that consider the political, institutional and economic changes that occurred in 
some of the countries included in this work and the differences in divorce law 
legislation. All of our results point to a robust pro-cyclical behavior of divorce in our 
sample of European countries. 
Because couples may react by putting off their marital decisions if there are 
changes in labor market conditions, there can be a lag in the impact of the 
unemployment rate on divorce, as suggested by Schaller (2013) and Amato and Beattie 
(2011). To address this issue, we include lagged unemployment rates in our analysis. 
Although the duration of the lag is not clear, we consider lags from 1 to 2 years, as there 
can be a lag between the divorce decision and the finalization of the divorce process. 
The results show that only the contemporaneous unemployment rate has an effect on 
divorce for our sample of European countries. 
 Later in this paper, we present a novel contribution to the existing literature by 
examining the possible non-linear response of divorce rates to fluctuations in the 
business cycle. We use this approach because the influence of certain country 
characteristics, such as the unemployment rate, may not be the same across the 
distribution of divorce rates. To explore this issue, we use non-parametric methods and 
quantile regressions. The descriptive results obtained with the non-parametric tools 
suggest that the decrease in divorce rates is greater when the unemployment rate is 
between 15% and 25%, but the response is still pro-cyclical. Moreover, the quantile 
regression analysis points to a non-linear response of divorce rates to changes in 
unemployment rates, with a greater negative impact on divorce rates in those countries 
with higher divorce rates. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data 
used. In Section 3, we describe the methodology and our main results. Section 4 
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presents the lag specifications. The non-linear analysis is conducted in Section 5, and 
Section 6 concludes.  
2. Data 
The divorce rate data covers 29 European countries for the period 1991 to 2012 and is 
publicly available from the UN Demographic Yearbooks and Eurostat.3 The divorce rate 
is calculated as the ratio of the number of divorces during the year per 1,000 inhabitants 
(population data were obtained from The World Bank). This rate is the standard 
measure of the evolution of divorce that is provided by all National Statistical Offices 
and International Organizations. Much of the recent literature uses divorces per 
thousand of population as the main dependent variable (see Friedberg, 1998, Wolfers, 
2006, and González and Viitanen, 2009, among many others). However, we recognize 
that the rates may be affected by the marital status structure of the populations to which 
they relate. Divorce rates may be low either because marriage rates are low or because 
marriages are less likely to end in divorce (Furtado et al., 2013). To examine this issue, 
we could have utilized total divorce rates, which are defined as the annual number of 
divorces per 1,000 married inhabitants, but this analysis would have been less reliable 
due to the scarcity of data on the married population, which is only available when each 
census is collected, normally every 10 years (Furtado et al., 2013).4 Thus, we favor the 
use of the crude divorce rate with a longer series, but we have also repeated the analysis 
using total divorce rates (see the Supplementary material).5 
To measure business cycle fluctuations, we use unemployment rates for the 
same period. Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work 
but is available for and seeking employment. This is a common indicator of economic 
                                                 
3 Due to problems with the availability of data on the divorce rate, we could not include in the analysis the 
following European countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, 
Liechtenstein, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine. 
The FYR of Macedonia was also excluded from the analysis, following the suggestions of two 
anonymous referees, as Macedonia can be considered to be an outlier in this analysis. The unemployment 
rate of Macedonia is considerably higher (more than twice) than that of the other European countries, 
with a rate near 30% in all periods considered, and the divorce rate is half of that in the other countries. In 
any case, we also repeated the analysis including the FYR of Macedonia, and the results did not change 
substantially.  
4 Although there may be some concerns about the use of the crude divorce rate, it is worth noting that 
other papers that contain information about both the crude divorce rate and the total divorce rate did not 
find differences in their results (see González-Val and Marcén, 2012a and Marcén, 2015). Those authors 
showed that both rates behave in the same manner. 
5 Census data offer the decennial stock of the married population. We fill the gaps in the married 
population via linear interpolation, as in other papers using US data (González-Val and Marcén, 2012a; 
Marcén, 2015). 
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conditions that is highly publicized and frequently used, which picks up not only the 
effects of individual job losses but also the variations in economic uncertainty. This 
aggregate variable can be useful in analyzing divorce behavior, as it is less likely to be 
endogenous to divorce decisions than other income or employment measures, such as 
own wages (Schaller, 2013). The unemployment rate is defined as the percentage of 
unemployed individuals in the labor force (see The World Bank; World Development 
Indicators). This rate includes changes in both labor demand and labor supply. There are 
also some concerns about the use of this variable, as it can understate the magnitude of a 
recession by failing to incorporate discouraged workers and because it can be a lagged 
indicator of economic recession. However, as Schaller (2013) pointed out, despite these 
weaknesses, the unemployment rate is the best available proxy to capture changes in the 
labor market conditions of married couples.  
Table 1 shows the average divorce and unemployment rates by country over the 
sample period and a list of the 29 European countries included here, ordered from low 
to high average unemployment rates. A great deal of variation can be observed, 
although for those Northern/Western European countries with low unemployment, the 
divorce rates are high, and for those countries located in Southern and Eastern Europe 
with quite high unemployment rates, the divorce rates are low. This pattern may 
indicate a possible negative relationship between unemployment and divorce rates, 
although it is not maintained in all cases, such as those countries that belonged to the 
Former USSR (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), which have both high divorce rates and 
high divorce rates. One possible explanation for those high average divorce rates is that 
couples can easily obtain a divorce under the USSR divorce law legislation and the 
subsequent reforms passed in each of these countries. As indicated in the literature, in 
the analysis of some European countries (González and Viitanen 2009; González-Val 
and Marcén 2012b) and also in the case of the US (González-Val and Marcén 2012a), 
more liberal divorce laws are associated with greater levels of divorce. Of course, 
having high average divorce and unemployment rates does not mean that a change in 
the unemployment rate will not have any effect on the divorce rate, but the existence of 
more liberal divorce laws, as mentioned above, can decrease divorce costs, making 
divorce more accessible to unemployed individuals. We revisit this issue below. 
Although more accepting attitudes towards divorce are usually associated with more 
liberal divorce laws and greater divorce rates, it is arguable that cultural differences can 
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impact divorce decisions, as outlined by Furtado et al. (2013). In Table 1, in most of the 
countries with a higher percentage of Catholic individuals (less accepting of divorce) 
(Italy, Ireland, Poland, and Spain, among others (data from the CIA World Factbook)), 
the divorce rate is lower, with some exceptions (for instance, Belgium). Thus, it is hard 
to explain the differences in the average divorce rates and the potential relationship of 
divorce rates with the unemployment rate. Even the evolution of divorce and 
unemployment rates at the country level (shown in Figure 1) does not appear to reveal a 
clear relationship between the unemployment rate and the divorce rate. Not all 
individual countries conform to the same behavior. 
By showing the temporal evolution of the average aggregate divorce and 
unemployment rates, it is easier to discern the movement of the rates (see Figure 2).6  A 
quick glance at the unemployment and divorce rate series appears to suggest the 
existence of a pro-cyclical response of divorce to the business cycle, at least at the 
aggregate level.7 Of course, this analysis is not conclusive. In the subsequent sections, 
we provide evidence of the relationship between unemployment and divorce rates. 
3. Methodology and results 
We estimate the following equation: 
itiititit TUnempDR εφηβα ++Π++= ' ,  (1) 
where itDR  is the crude divorce rate of country i in year t and itUnemp  is the 
unemployment rate of country i in the year t. iη  is a vector of country fixed effects 
(∑−
=
1
1
n
i
iCountry ) that picks up the impact of unobserved characteristics that vary at the 
country level. itT  is a matrix of time variables that incorporates: time fixed effects 
(∑−
=
1
1
t
t
tYear ), country-specific linear time trends (∑−
=
⋅
1
1
n
i
ti TimeCountry ), and quadratic 
country-specific time trends (∑−
=
⋅
1
1
2
n
i
ti TimeCountry ) that allow us to capture the effect of 
unobserved characteristics that vary over time. itε  is the error term. This framework 
                                                 
6 The Ireland divorce rate was excluded from that figure because divorce was not allowed in that country 
until the 1990s. The Family Law Act that regulates divorce was passed in 1996, although the act was not 
in force until 1997. The rest of the countries introduced divorce many years earlier. All of the analysis 
presented in this work was repeated without Ireland, and the results did not change. 
7 The pattern of the crude divorce rate coincides with that of the total divorce rate (see the Supplementary 
material). 
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exploits variations in unemployment behavior over time and across countries, as Amato 
and Beattie (2011) and Schaller (2013) did for US states. The strategy used to identify 
the relationship between unemployment and divorce rates is based on the exogeneity of 
variations in country unemployment rates, although there may be some concerns about 
this issue. For instance, women are likely to change their participation in the labor 
market if their marital status varies, which could drive changes in unemployment rates. 
We revisit this issue below following Schaller (2013). As we explained above, from a 
theoretical point of view, whether or not divorce rates respond in a pro-cyclical manner 
remains unclear. Therefore, the sign of the β  coefficient could be positive (counter-
cyclical behavior) or negative (pro-cyclical behavior). 
Table 2 shows the regression results for the model presented in Equation (1), 
with all of the regressions weighted by country population. Without any controls, 
column (1), the estimated coefficient that picks up the impact of the unemployment rate 
is statistically significant and negative, pointing to a pro-cyclical reaction of divorce.8 
The results are similar after adding controls for country and year fixed effects, in 
addition to country-specific linear and quadratic time trends, column (2), although the 
magnitude of the effect decreases (in absolute value). This change is not striking, as by 
including those controls, we are removing the effect of unobservable characteristics that 
can vary at the country level and/or over time, such as cultural differences (Furtado, et 
al. 2013).9 Our results indicate that a one-percentage-point increase in the 
unemployment rate is related to 0.025 fewer divorces per thousand individuals (on 
average).10 As reported by Schaller (2013) for the US, this impact appears to be minor, 
representing 1.2% of the average European divorce rate during the period considered. 
Our findings are maintained if the dependent variable is measured in logarithm (see 
column (3)). 
                                                 
8 We repeated all of the analysis with/without population weights and with/without clustering the standard 
errors, and the results did not vary. 
9 We recognize that the country fixed effects and the country-specific linear and quadratic time trends do 
not capture other patterns of the unobservable characteristics that differ across countries. However, it is 
worth noting that after the inclusion of the controls (country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country-
specific linear and quadratic time trends) the R-squared value is approximately 0.97. Thus, the possibility 
that the existence of other patterns in the unobservable factors that differ across countries would be 
driving the behavior of the divorce rates is unlikely because our model is able to explain almost all of the 
variation of the divorce rates.  
10 In the case of Ireland, data on divorce is only available since 1997 because divorce was not allowed 
before that date. As mentioned above, our findings do not change when Ireland is excluded from the 
sample. 
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One potential problem with our estimates can appear if the variations in the 
unemployment rates are driven by variations in marriage and divorce rates, generating 
concerns about exogeneity. As suggested above, this scenario could happen through 
changes in the female labor supply, which can affect the unemployment rate.11 For 
example, if more women remain single or if divorced women do not re-marry, then 
more women may be participating in the labor market (Fernández and Wong, 2014a; 
2014b). However, as Schaller (2013) explained, whether decreases or increases in 
women’s participation in the labor market correspond with variations in the overall 
unemployment rate remains unclear. In addition, as shown in the literature, the increase 
in divorce rates accounts for a very small portion of the increase in female employment 
rates (Eckstein and Lifshitz, 2011). In any case, to tackle this issue, we repeated the 
analysis using the male unemployment rate because men are less likely to vary their 
participation in the labor market due to changes in their marital status (see a similar 
analysis in Schaller, 2013). That variable is defined as the percentage of men in the 
labor force who are without work but available for and seeking employment (Source: 
World Bank). The results are quite similar (columns (4) to (6) in Table 2). We detect an 
inverse relationship between male unemployment and divorce. Even the magnitude of 
the impact of unemployment on divorce is the same as that seen in columns (2) and (3) 
after adding all controls (see columns (5) and (6)). It is re-assuring that adding or 
deleting all controls and/or changing the unemployment rate does not vary our findings 
concerning the relationship between unemployment and divorce rates.12 All of these 
results also remain unchanged if the dependent variable is re-defined (see the 
Supplementary material). In Table B1, the divorce rate is measured as the annual 
number of divorces per 1,000 married females. The magnitude of the effect varies, but 
this observation is not surprising because the definition of the dependent variable 
changes in those specifications. 
                                                 
11 It is also arguable that if the number of divorced individuals increases, the demand for housing could 
also increase when divorcees do not move in with a new partner. In this setting, a rise in the number of 
divorced individuals could drive changes in unemployment rates through an increase in the number of 
workers in the building sector. However, changes in the building sector take time because it is not easy to 
build a new house or building in a few days (projects, licenses are hard to obtain, etc.); thus, an impact of 
the divorce rate on the contemporaneous unemployment rate would be unlikely. It would be more likely 
to detect changes in the renting of houses, which normally demands fewer workers than the construction 
sector. From those arguments, it would be unlikely to observe variations in the contemporaneous 
unemployment rate caused by changes in the divorce rates, mitigating previous concerns.  
12 We re-ran all of the analysis excluding each country, one at a time, and excluding those countries that 
exhibit the highest and the lowest unemployment and divorce rates. The results did not change 
substantially. 
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It is arguable that not only the shock of job loss but also the impact of the 
evolution of the business cycle on the household income of couples, whether or not one 
spouse is unemployed, influences divorce decisions. Divorce can be more tempting for 
those married individuals who can afford to maintain their standard of living outside of 
marriage, implying a positive relationship between income and divorce (Furtado et al., 
2013). Then, those individuals who would endure greater economic constraints during 
an economic recession would be less likely to divorce. The association between income 
and divorce could also be negative because high-income couples typically own assets 
(large houses, second residence, investments expensive furniture, etc.) that are difficult 
to sell during an economic recession (for division after a divorce) (Becker et al., 1977). 
To tackle this issue, we use country GDP per capita in logarithm, calculated in US 
dollars at 2005 constant prices (data source: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators), as a proxy for household income.13 These estimates are displayed in 
columns (7) to (10) of Table 2. We obtain a positive and statistically significant impact 
of GDP per capita on divorce without controls (column (7)). However, although it 
remains positive, the coefficient that captures the effect of GDP per capita is not 
statistically significant after the inclusion of country and year fixed effects, in addition 
to country-specific linear and quadratic time trends (column (8)). The same non-
statistically significant coefficient, though with a negative sign, is detected even when 
we add the unemployment rate variable in column (9). With respect to the effect of the 
unemployment rate, we observe no changes: the divorce rate is negatively associated 
with the unemployment rate. Column (10) displays the estimates after measuring the 
dependent variable in logarithm, and the results are similar. 
Additionally, one can surmise that not only the evolution of the business cycle 
but also the differences in the responsiveness of the married couples to that evolution is 
important, depending on whether those couples live in poor or rich countries. On the 
one hand, costly divorces can be less accessible for married couples living in poor 
countries than those living in rich countries. If this scenario happens, the response of the 
divorce rate to the unemployment rate can differ between poor and rich countries. On 
the other hand, because divorce decisions frequently follow from negotiation between 
the two partners rather than from an individual decision, the bargaining power of each 
                                                 
13 No data were available for the whole period in the cases of Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. For consistency, we repeated the analysis without those countries. The results did 
not vary. 
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member of the couple can be relevant, which could differ across countries. If women 
living in high-income countries are more educated than those living in poor countries, 
they have higher earning power, improving their bargaining position in a possible 
divorce. In our sample, this matter might not be of great importance because the World 
Bank classifies all but two of the countries included in our analysis as high-income level 
countries, and as shown above, we do not observe any relationship between the GDP 
per capita and the divorce rate. In any case, to provide even more evidence that 
differences in the level of income at the country level are not driving our results, we 
repeated the analysis by excluding those two countries that are considered to be upper-
middle income countries by the World Bank (Bulgaria and Romania). The results are 
presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3. Our findings do not change after the 
exclusion of those observations because the coefficients that capture the effect of the 
overall unemployment or the impact of male unemployment are negative and 
statistically significant. In addition, even the change in the magnitude of the effect is 
very small. 
Another concern with the sample considered in this study could be the inclusion 
of countries that obtained their independence in the early 1990s. Seven of the twenty-
nine countries are in this situation (Source: The World Factbook of the CIA). This 
situation could be problematic if our estimates confound the effect of this political and 
institutional environment on divorce with a relationship between divorce and 
unemployment. For example, those countries that belonged to the Former USSR 
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) had to approve their own divorce legislation. In some 
cases, this process took a lot of time; some of the new laws were not passed until 2000. 
Surely, this process increased uncertainty about the possible grounds for obtaining a 
divorce, affecting the divorce decisions of individuals for reasons unrelated to the 
changes in other potential determinants of the evolution of the divorce rate. To address 
this issue, we repeated the analysis excluding those seven countries (Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia), and the results were 
unchanged (see columns (3) and (4) of Table 3). Then, including or excluding those 
countries does not appear to affect the estimated relationship between unemployment 
and divorce. 
We have also added controls for other political, institutional, and economic 
changes that occurred during the period considered in this study, as our estimates might 
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capture the effect of those changes in addition to or instead of the impact of business 
cycle fluctuations. One of the major changes that occurred in some European countries 
is their incorporation into the European Union as member states. Twelve of the included 
countries were members prior to the start of our study period. Thirteen of the twenty-
nine countries became member states of the European Union during that period (Source: 
European Union webpage). We incorporate this factor into our analysis by using a 
dummy variable that takes the value “1” from the year in which a state became a 
member of the European Union and the value “0” otherwise. The results are shown in 
Table 3, columns (5) and (6). The estimated coefficient of the effect of being a EU 
member is not statistically significant. With respect to the relationship between the 
unemployment rate and the divorce rate, no differences were observed. The use of the 
same currency was another relevant change that occurred in Europe since 1999. Fifteen 
countries from our sample are members of the European Union and use the Euro 
(source: European Central Bank webpage). To control for this change, we add a dummy 
variable that takes the value of “1” from the year in which a state became a member of 
the European Union that uses the Euro and the value “0” otherwise. The results are 
presented in columns (7) and (8) of Table 3. As in the previous case, the coefficient 
capturing the effect of the use of the same currency is not statistically significant, 
whereas the divorce rate appears to respond in a pro-cyclical manner to variations in the 
business cycle. Both dummies are included in the same specification in columns (9) and 
(10), and our conclusions do not vary. 
Our estimated points can also generate concerns if, for example, they are picking 
up differences in the age-structure of the population, in addition to the relationship 
between unemployment rates and divorce rates. If older individuals are less likely to get 
divorced (Peters, 1986) and less likely to be unemployed, then the older the population, 
the lower the expected unemployment and divorce rates. To tackle this issue, we added 
the median age of each country’s population (data source: Eurostat) in column (1) of 
Table 4.14 The estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. This observation can 
be explained by the recent findings of Bruze et al. (2015), who found that the costs of 
divorce are high in the earlier and later stages of marriage, pointing to a lower 
importance of the age-structure. Female labor force participation is also included in 
column (2) as a control. This variable is measured as the percentage of the female 
                                                 
14 Information is only available from 2001 in the case of Croatia. For consistency, we ran all the analysis 
without the information for this country, and the results are unchanged. 
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population over age 15 years that is economically active (data source: World 
Development Indicators). We add this variable because it is possible to hold that 
changes in divorce rates are driven by the participation of women in the labor force 
(Allen, 1998; Nunley and Zietz, 2008). If a woman is inactive, her husband’s job loss 
could lead to greater economic problems than in the case that she is economically 
active, increasing the difficulties of pursuing a costly divorce. The inclusion of the 
female labor force participation rate along with the median age does not modify our 
results (see column (3)).  
Cultural differences can also affect divorce decisions. As stated by Furtado et al. 
(2013), beliefs about the morality of divorce are passed on through religion. The 
Catholic Church teaches that marriages cannot be dissolved and even ostracizes 
divorced individuals, while more liberal Protestant denominations support divorce laws 
(Bahr and Chadwick, 1985). Thus, the response of married couples to an unemployment 
situation can differ if the spouses are Catholic. In our sample, 17 of 29 countries can be 
classified as having the Catholic religion as the main religion of the majority of the 
population (Source: The World Factbook, CIA). To control for this factor, we add a 
dummy variable that takes the value “1” if the country has the Catholic religion as the 
main religion of its population and the value “0” otherwise. The estimates of this 
specification are displayed in columns (4) and (5). The results pertaining to our variable 
of interest (the unemployment rate) do not vary. With respect to the effect of the 
religion control, as expected, we observed a negative relationship between having a 
Catholic population and the divorce rate, although this coefficient is not statistically 
significant when we add the rest of the controls in column (5).15 After the incorporation 
of all of these controls, the results are not altered when we use the male unemployment 
rate in columns (6) and (7). Overall, our estimates always point to a pro-cyclical 
response of divorce rates. 
In all of our results, the response of the divorce rate to variations in the 
unemployment rate is small, which is quite similar to observations in the US (Schaller, 
2013). However, this outcome is not expected if one takes into consideration the 
generosity of the welfare systems of some of the European countries incorporated in this 
                                                 
15 We recognize that changes in these variables may drive unemployment and divorce rates. Although 
this issue can be problematic, it is comforting that adding or deleting all of these variables does not affect 
our conclusions concerning the relationship between divorce and unemployment rates. 
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analysis (Alesina et al., 2001). This generosity could reduce the effects of economic 
problems on households, making divorce more accessible. To provide even more 
additional evidence in favor of the negative relationship between divorce and 
unemployment, we repeated the analysis in Table 5 by including a control for the cash 
benefits received by unemployed individuals. Cash benefits are measured as public 
unemployment spending to compensate for unemployment. This factor includes 
redundancy payments from public funds, as well as the payment of pensions to 
beneficiaries before they reach the standard pensionable age, if these payments are 
made because the beneficiaries are out of work or for other labor market policy reasons 
(OECD dataset).16 Cash benefits are calculated as a percentage of the GDP (columns (1) 
and (2) in Table 5) and per head in constant 2005 US dollars (columns (3) and (4)). Of 
course, we recognize that a strong correlation exists between the unemployment rate 
and cash benefits, which can bias our estimates; however, even with this problem, our 
results concerning the relationship between unemployment and divorce do not vary, 
regardless of the definition of the unemployment rate.  
To this point, we have examined the relationship between unemployment and 
divorce without taking into account how couples can obtain a divorce. Divorce 
legislation differs across Europe. However, since the 1970s, several reforms have 
occurred throughout European countries, making divorce laws much more 
homogeneous by including the irretrievable breakdown ground, as shown in Tables 6 
and 7. After a careful examination of all of the laws regulating divorce issues, we have 
summarized all of the grounds for divorce that are included in European legislation in 
Table 6, including the major reforms that were passed since 1991. We divide these 
grounds into three categories: the Fault, Mutual Consent, and Irretrievable 
Breakdown/Separation grounds. In Europe, it is possible to obtain a divorce by fault 
(domestic violence, etc.), by agreement between the spouses (with/without separation 
periods requirements), and by an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage (this also 
admits mutual consent in some countries). The last ground, the irretrievable breakdown 
of the marriage, includes a separation period as proof of the marital breakdown in many 
cases. For other countries, separation is considered to be a separate ground for divorce, 
although in our summary, we included both irretrievable breakdown and separation in 
the same ground. Several countries, such as Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, among 
                                                 
16 Observations are not available for the whole sample. For this reason, we repeated the analysis with only 
that sample (columns (5) and (6) of Table 5), and our results are the same. 
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others, do not require specific separation periods in the irretrievable breakdown ground. 
In those countries, the judges decide whether or not the marriage is broken by analyzing 
each case individually.  
Under this framework, it is possible to suggest that the response of married 
individuals to unemployment can differ depending on how that couple can obtain a 
divorce. Some of the separation period requirements may discourage married couples 
from divorcing because of economic downturns if they are required to live apart for 2 or 
3 years, as in the cases of the United Kingdom and Hungary, respectively, even by 
mutual consent. To avoid this problem, we re-ran our analysis while selecting those 
countries that allowed divorce under mutual consent with a separation period of 1 year 
or less.17 Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 show the estimated coefficients. Once again, 
the coefficient that captures the impact of unemployment on divorce is negative and 
statistically significant, regardless of the type of unemployment rate (whole 
unemployment rate or male unemployment rate), and even the magnitude of the effect 
changes very little. Thus, adding or deleting observations from the countries where 
divorce is more difficult under mutual consent does not modify our findings. 
When married couples do not agree, the divorce process is much more difficult 
and costly. In such cases, the separation requirement varies (for example, 8 years in 
Bulgaria, as determined by the Supreme Court of that country, to 0 years in Spain (no 
need for separation) since the approval of divorce law reform in 2005). We included the 
category “Divorce with the opposition of one of the spouses” with the separation period 
requirements in Table 6. This category is not a specific ground for divorce, but several 
divorce regulations include this category in their family laws. The rest of the regulations 
do not include this category, but the judges decide whether or not an individual can 
obtain a divorce with the opposition of his/her spouse. As stated before, separation 
period requirements may discourage married couples from divorcing. Focusing on those 
countries in which the separation period is greater than 1 year, we observe that for those 
countries, the response of the divorce rate to the unemployment rate is still pro-cyclical 
(see columns (3) and (4) in Table 8). The magnitude of the effect decreases (in absolute 
                                                 
17 We have repeated the estimates by including/excluding those countries that introduced reforms related 
to the separation period during the period considered, and the results are maintained. 
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value), pointing to a lower impact of the business cycle on divorce when divorce is less 
accessible without mutual consent.18  
Not only the grounds for divorce but also divorce processes and some issues 
related to the aftermath of divorce (spousal maintenance and joint custody) were 
addressed in this work (see Table 7). As mentioned previously, no common law 
regulates the divorce process across Europe. In twenty-two of the twenty-nine included 
countries, married couples need a court order to divorce, which can make divorce more 
costly. Although a non-judicial process can grant divorce in some countries, it is 
required the mutual consent of married couples (in most cases, couples with children 
cannot choose the administrative process). To provide more convincing evidence to 
mitigate the possible concerns that any of these regulations is driving our results, the 
specification was estimated using a sample of countries that excludes those countries 
that do not require a court order to get a divorce. The results are reported in columns (5) 
and (6) in Table 8. Similarly, we repeated the analysis with those countries that 
incorporate the principle of guilt in their legislation to establish any limitation of 
spousal maintenance (see columns (7) and (8)). Lastly, we also chose a sample of 
countries that introduced reforms pertaining to the custody of children (joint parenthood 
or joint physical custody) (columns (9) and (10)). A negative relationship between 
unemployment and divorce was obtained in all cases, regardless of the sample of 
countries and the associated reforms.19 Our findings point again to a pro-cyclical 
response of the divorce rate to business cycle variations. 
4. Lag specification 
Thus far, we have examined the contemporary effect of unemployment rates on divorce 
rates. Nevertheless, we mentioned above that the economic constraints generated by job 
loss could lead couples to postpone their divorce decisions because they cannot afford 
to pursue a costly divorce. These couples are forced to support themselves together. As 
times passes, the cumulative psychosocial stress increases (for example, because of the 
increased level of friction between individuals, who in many cases, ‘cannot stand each 
other’). In such cases, some couples may decide to divorce in spite of their economic 
                                                 
18 We take into account the divorce law reforms that occurred during the period considered to calculate 
our estimates.  
19 The magnitude of the effect varies a little, especially in the case of joint custody reform, but this result 
should be interpreted with caution because we are considering all reforms pertaining to joint custody, not 
only those related to joint physical custody.  
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problems. As Amato and Beattie (2011) explained, in this setting, we would expect a 
negative effect of the contemporaneous unemployment rate on divorce and a positive 
impact of lagged unemployment rates. 
 To explore this topic, we add the lagged unemployment rates to Equation (1). As 
Schaller (2013) and Amato and Beattie (2011) remarked, the duration of the lag is not 
clear. We add lags from 1 to 2 years because there can be a lag between the divorce 
decision and the date of the divorce, depending, for example, on the separation period 
requirements.20 The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 9. In column (1), we 
only observe an inverse relationship between the contemporaneous unemployment rate 
and the divorce rate. The coefficients that pick up the impact of the lagged 
unemployment rates are not statistically significant. The cumulative total effect of 
unemployment on divorce is -0.035, with an F-stat for joint significance of 3.73 
(p>F=0.063). As in the previous section, we repeated the analysis using the male 
unemployment rate instead of the whole unemployment rate to tackle the issue of the 
potential bias that that variable can generate. Column (2) reports the estimates, which 
exhibit no significant differences, and even the magnitude of the impact is quite similar. 
Once again, we find a negative association between the unemployment and divorce 
rates. This association is also maintained if the divorce rate is defined as the total 
divorce rate (see Table B6 in the Supplementary material). 
 With an argument concerning divorce costs that is similar to that used to justify 
the use of lagged unemployment rates, it is possible to suppose that the impact of 
variations in household income (without implying a job loss) due to business cycle 
fluctuations can also be lagged. Here, we also use as a proxy the GDP per capita. The 
estimates after including that variable and its lags are reported in columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 9. The estimated coefficients capturing the impact of the contemporaneous GDP 
per capita and its lags are not statistically significant (see column 3). Indeed, this does 
not change when the unemployment rate variable and its lags are incorporated in 
column (4). Respecting the estimates of the unemployment rate and its lags, we observe 
similar results in columns (1) and (4); there is a negative association between the 
contemporaneous unemployment rate and the divorce rate. Therefore, using European 
data, we find no evidence in favor of the psychological approach, which is in line with 
the work of Amato and Beattie (2011) and Schaller (2013), who used US data. 
                                                 
20 This analysis was repeated including more lags. We obtained the same results. 
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5. Non-linear analysis 
In this section, we use an alternative approach. The results presented above are derived 
from linear models; however, one can surmise that variables respond in a non-linear 
manner. In our case, a portion of the variation in divorce rates may reflect the fact that 
the influence of certain country characteristics, particularly the unemployment rate, is 
not uniform across the distribution of this variable. For example, a job loss could be 
considered to be a motive for divorce in those countries with low acceptance of divorce 
(normally countries with low divorce rates, Furtado et al., 2013) because in more 
traditional countries, a job loss considerably decreases the economic expectations for 
the unemployed member of a couple (especially in the case where men are the 
breadwinners). In this setting, the gains derived from marriage in a situation of 
unemployment would decrease more in countries with low acceptance of divorce (low 
divorce rates) than in countries that are more accepting of divorce (high divorce rates), 
making divorce more likely. To model these possible heterogeneous effects of the 
unemployment rate on the divorce rates, we use non-parametric tools and quantile 
regressions. While non-parametric tools give us descriptive information about the 
empirical distribution of the variables, quantile regressions allow us to make inferences 
about the non-linear relationship between divorce and unemployment.  
Eeckhout (2004) and Ioannides and Overman (2004) highlighted the advantages 
of non-parametric methods over the standard parametric approach (e.g., a correlation 
index). Basically, non-parametric tools do not impose a structure on the underlying 
relationships, which may be non-linear and may change over time. First, we study how 
the distribution of divorce rates is related to the distribution of unemployment rates 
(Ioannides and Overman, 2004). Figure 3 shows the stochastic kernel estimation of the 
distribution of crude divorce rates, which is conditional on the distribution of 
unemployment rates on the same date, for a pool of 632 observations from our sample 
of 29 European countries over the period from 1991 to 2012. To facilitate interpretation, 
the contour plot is also shown. If both distributions were independent, the contour plot 
would show the estimated density around a vertical or horizontal straight line. 
Nevertheless, although the estimated density is rather concentrated, the plot reveals a 
negative relationship between the two distributions: the lower the unemployment rates, 
the higher the divorce rates. Second, we conduct a non-parametric estimation of the 
effects of unemployment on divorce rates. To achieve this estimation, we estimate the 
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non-linear relationship between the unemployment and divorce rates using local 
polynomial smoothing for the pool of 632 observations from 1991 to 2012.21 Figure 4 
shows the results, including the 95% confidence intervals. This graph complements 
Figure 3. The negative relationship is clear; as the unemployment rates increase, the 
divorce rates decrease. This result confirms the estimated effect that was obtained in 
Section 3. Furthermore, Figure 4 shows a non-linear effect: the decline in the divorce 
rate is greater, the higher the unemployment rate. The graph shows a slight negative 
relationship for unemployment rates below 15%, and then the divorce rate suddenly 
decreases when the unemployment rate is between 15% and 25%. 
To model the possible heterogeneous effects of unemployment on the divorce 
rate, we also estimate quantile regressions (Koenker and Bassett, 1978). The quantile 
regression version of the linear model shown in Equation (1) can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itiititit TUnempDR ζητφττβτα ++Π++= ' .  (2) 
Note that the estimated parameters are τ -dependent in this case, where τ  is the 
corresponding quantile of the divorce rate. Thus, quantile regressions provide a richer 
characterization of the data, allowing us to consider the impact of the unemployment 
rate on the entire distribution of DR  and not merely its conditional mean. Quantile 
regressions take into account unobserved heterogeneity and allow for heteroskedasticity 
among the disturbances, non-normal errors, and are more robust to outliers than 
standard OLS regressions. 22 
Figure 5 shows the quantile regression results for the divorce rate model of 
Equation 2. The graph displays the estimates of the coefficient and the 95% confidence 
intervals for the unemployment rate across the nine quantiles considered (ranges from 
0.1 to 0.9). The model includes all of the controls (country fixed effects, country-
specific linear and quadratic time trends, and time fixed effects), and our estimates are 
weighted by country population. As in the previous estimates, we find a significant 
negative impact of unemployment on divorce in all of the quantiles, although the effect 
is clearly non-linear: the higher the quantile, the greater the impact of unemployment on 
                                                 
21 The local polynomial provides a smoother fit for the divorce rate to a polynomial form of the 
unemployment rate, via locally-weighted least squares. We used the lpolyci command in STATA with the 
following options: local mean smoothing, a Gaussian kernel function to calculate the locally-weighted 
polynomial regression, and a bandwidth determined by Silverman’s (1986) rule-of-thumb. 
22 Moreover, quantile regressions are invariant to monotonic transformations of the dependent variable, 
such as logarithms. 
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divorce rates. In particular, the quantile estimates show that the effect of unemployment 
is 3.5 times higher (in absolute value) in the top quantile (0.9) than in the bottom 
quantile (0.1), as the coefficient decreases from -0.006 to -0.022, pointing to a higher 
effect of unemployment on divorce in those countries with higher divorce rates. 
6. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the impact of business cycles on divorce 
rates. From a theoretical point of view, the relationship is not clear. The effects vary 
depending on the benefits (e.g., the view of marriage as insurance) or costs (e.g., 
psychological stress) that staying married can generate for a couple who has decided to 
divorce. The effects can also depend on the specific costs of divorce and on the 
possibilities outside marriage (i.e., remarriage and/or being able to maintain the same 
standard of living). The empirical evidence for these issues is quite scarce, mainly 
focused on the United States, and oftentimes exhibit conflicting results.  
Our analysis covers 29 European countries from 1991 to 2012. In this 
framework, as is common in the literature, we examine the relationship between the 
business cycle and divorce by using the unemployment rate as the main proxy for the 
evolution of economic conditions. Our findings suggest that divorce rates respond in a 
pro-cyclical way to variations in the business cycle, since we find empirical evidence of 
a significant negative association between unemployment rates and divorce rates. This 
is consistent with most of the recent works using US aggregate data. Our results are 
quite robust to the introduction of controls, which allow us to capture the impact of 
unobservable factors, such as country and year fixed effects in addition to country-
specific linear and quadratic trends. Also, our results are invariant to controls for other 
characteristics measured at the country level, such as cultural differences, changes in 
population composition, differences in the generosity of the cash benefits, or even the 
participation of women in the labor force. Results are also unchanged when we use 
different sub-samples considering the political, institutional, and economic changes that 
occurred during the period considered as well as the differences in the divorce law 
legislation. Therefore, it appears that the economic constraints generated by the loss of a 
job can make resorting to a costly divorce less likely; but, it is also possible that the 
economic uncertainty generated by recession and high unemployment rates also 
discourages divorce decisions. 
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We should note that the magnitude of the effect is quite small, since a one-
percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with 0.025 fewer 
divorces per thousand inhabitants, representing 1.2% of the average European divorce 
rate during the period considered. Although the effects of unemployment on divorce are 
not expected to be identical between Europe and the US due to all the differences 
described in this work, the small impact observed in the case of the US (see Schaller, 
2013) is also detected in our work. In the same line, the timing analysis points to a small 
negative effect of the contemporaneous unemployment rate on the divorce rate. Results 
do not vary when we change the definition of the divorce rate and/or the definition of 
the unemployment rate to consider only the male unemployment rate, in order to avoid 
endogeneity concerns, because male labor-market participation is less likely to change 
when the marital status varies.  
Our findings suggest that severe economic recessions that correspond to higher 
unemployment rates can dissuade couples from seeking a divorce. But, even if this 
occurs, the response of divorce to unemployment variations can follow a non-linear 
pattern. Divorce decisions under the same level of unemployment can be more likely 
within a country with less accepting attitudes towards divorce, which correspond with 
low divorce rates and lower social approval of job losses, than in a country that is more 
accepting of divorce having high divorce rates. Our analysis makes use of non-
parametric tools and quantile regressions to re-examine the relationship between 
unemployment and divorce rates. Again, the results show a negative relationship 
between unemployment and divorce rates in European countries. The non-linear pattern 
indicates that the inverse relationship is more pronounced in those countries with higher 
divorce rates. 
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Table 1. Average divorce and unemployment rates by country 
 
Country 
Crude divorce 
rate 
(1991-2012) 
Unemployment 
rate 
(1991-2012) 
Luxembourg 2.17 3.48 
Switzerland 2.37 3.57 
Iceland 1.82 3.99 
Norway 2.26 4.02 
Austria 2.28 4.12 
Netherlands 2.06 4.6 
Czech Republic 2.98 6.13 
Denmark 2.64 6.13 
Slovenia 1.1 6.62 
United Kingdom 2.57 6.93 
Portugal 1.92 7.01 
Romania 1.57 7.12 
Sweden 2.39 7.39 
Ireland1 0.66 7.46 
Belgium 2.71 8 
Germany 2.25 8.19 
Hungary 2.38 8.63 
Estonia 3.22 9.25 
Italy 0.7 9.5 
France 2.02 10 
Finland 2.59 10.05 
Greece 1 10.67 
Croatia 1.03 12.12 
Latvia 3.05 12.6 
Lithuania 3.3 12.9 
Poland 1.3 13.23 
Bulgaria 1.43 13.4 
Slovakia 1.92 14.07 
Spain 1.4 16.61 
Europe 2.05 8.55 
Sources: World Development Indicators (The World Bank), Eurostat and United 
Nations Demographic Yearbooks.  
1Ireland data from 1997 to 2012. 
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Table 2. Divorce rate models, OLS estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Unemployment rate -0.063*** -0.025** -0.014***      -0.028**  
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.005)      (0.011)  
Male Unemployment rate    -0.032* -0.025** -0.013***     
    (0.017) (0.009) (0.005)     
GDP Per Capita (ln scale)       0.284** 0.645 -0.272 0.368 
       (0.130) (0.469) (0.565) (0.274) 
Country fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
Country x Time N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
R2 0.129 0.960 0.971 0.028 0.960 0.971 0.079 0.958 0.961 0.969 
Observations 632 632 632 632 632 632 601 601 601 601 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Crude divorce rate in Columns (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), (8) and (9), and the crude divorce rate in logarithm in Columns (3), (6) and (10). 
Robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions are weighted by country population. Ireland data from 1997 to 2012. There is no information of the 
GDP per capita for all the period considered in the case of Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. ***Significant at the 1% level, **significant 
at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 3. Divorce rate models, considering political and institutional changes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Unemployment rate -0.025**  -0.026**  -0.025**  -0.027**  -0.027**  
 (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)  
Male Unemployment rate  -0.024**  -0.026**  -0.024**  -0.026**  -0.026** 
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
EU member     0.124 0.117   0.128 0.120 
     (0.104) (0.108)   (0.102) (0.107) 
Adopted Euro       -0.094 -0.087 -0.098 -0.090 
       (0.095) (0.091) (0.094) (0.090) 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.961 0.961 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Observations 588 588 478 478 632 632 632 632 632 632 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Crude divorce rate. Robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions are weighted by country population. Ireland data from 
1997 to 2012. Columns (1) and (2) do not include the observations of the Upper-middle-income economies (Bulgaria and Romania) following the classification of 
the World Bank. In Columns (3) and (4) the observations from the countries that obtain the independence of another country (Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia) are excluded from the sample. ***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4. Divorce rate models: Adding controls for Age, FLFP and Religion 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Unemployment rate -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025** -0.025***   
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)   
Male Unemployment rate      -0.024*** -0.024***
      (0.008) (0.008) 
Median Age -0.158  -0.146  -0.146 -0.162 -0.162 
 (0.166)  (0.154)  (0.154) (0.160) (0.160) 
FLFP  0.013 0.008  0.008 0.006 0.006 
  (0.017) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Catholic    -2.300*** 0.902  0.949 
    (0.013) (1.001)  (1.020) 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.961 0.960 0.961 0.960 0.961 0.961 0.961 
Observations 622 632 622 632 622 622 622 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Crude divorce rate. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country. All regressions are weighted by country population. Ireland data from 1997 to 
2012. The median age is only available since 2001 in the case of Croatia. Countries are 
classified as Catholic if in that country the majority of individuals are Catholics 
following the classification of the World Factbook of the CIA. ***Significant at the 1% 
level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5. Divorce rate models: Adding cash benefits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Unemployment rate -0.023**  -0.023**  -0.024**  
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  
Male Unemployment rate  -0.023**  -0.023**  -0.023** 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
% Cash Benefits  -0.016 -0.015     
 (0.057) (0.058)     
Cash Benefits per head   -0.039 -0.033   
   (0.057) (0.060)   
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.964 0.963 0.964 0.963 0.964 0.963 
Observations 480 480 480 480 480 480 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Crude divorce rate. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country. All regressions are weighted by country population. Ireland data from 1997 to 
2012. Data on Public Cash Benefits for unemployed individuals is obtained from the 
OECD dataset. Columns (1) and (2) include the cash benefits measured in percentage of 
the GDP. In columns (3) and (4), cash benefits are calculated per head, at constant 
prices, in 2005 US dollars. ***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, 
*significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 6. Divorce Legislation: Grounds for divorce 
   Grounds for divorce 
Country  Fault  Mutual Consent  Irretrievable Breakdown/ Separation    Divorce with the opposition of one of the spouses 
Austria  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991 (6 months MB)  Pre‐1991 (3‐6 years MB)  Pre‐1991  (6 years) 
Belgium 
Pre‐1991; 2007 
(SF)  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991  (5 years S); 2000 (2 years S); 2007 (6 months S)  Pre‐1991 (5 years);  2000 (2 years); 2007 (1 year) 
Bulgaria  Pre‐1991 ( R )  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991 (8 years) 
Croatia  No  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991 (1 year  S)  Pre‐1991 (1 year) 
Czech Republic  Pre‐1991 (SF)  No  Pre‐1991 (MC: 1 year MB/ 6 months S)  1998  (3 years) 
Denmark  Pre‐1991  No  Pre‐1991 (MC: 6 months S; 2 years  S)  Pre‐1991 (2 years) 
Estonia (NL)  No  1994  1994; 2009 (2 years S)  2009 (2 years) 
Finland  No  No  Pre‐1991 (2 years  S and no reconsideration period)  Pre‐1991 (6 months reconsideration period) 
France  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991 (6 years S); 2004 (2 years S)  Pre‐1991 (6 years S); 2004 (2 years S) 
Germany  Pre‐1991 ( R )  No  Pre‐1991 (MC: 1 year S; 3 years S)  Pre‐1991 (3 years) 
Greece  Pre‐1991 (IB)  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991 (4 years S); 2008 (2 years S)  Pre‐1991 (4 years); 2008 (2 years ) 
Hungary  No  No  Pre‐1991 (MC: 3 years S)  Pre‐1991 (at the discretion of the court) 
Iceland  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991 (1 year S)  Pre‐1991 (3 years S); 1993 (2 years S)  Pre‐1991 (3 years); 1993 (2 years ) 
Ireland  No  No  1996 (4 years S of the last 5 years)  1996 (4 years S of the last 5 years) 
Italy  No  No  Pre‐1991 (3 years legal separation)  Pre‐1991 (3 years legal separation) 
Latvia (NL)  No  1993  1993 (3 years S)  1993 (3 years ) 
Lithuania (NL)  Pre‐1991  2000  2000 ( 1 year S)  Pre‐1991 (1 year) 
Luxembourg  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991 (3 years S)  Pre‐1991 (3 years) 
Netherlands  No  No 
Pre‐1991 (MC: (0); court decision); 2002  (2 years S no 
MC) 
Pre‐1991 (at the discretion of the court) ; 2002 (2 
years) 
Norway  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991 (2 years  S)  1991 (2 years) 
Poland  Pre‐1991 (SF)  No  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991 (at the discretion of the court) 
Portugal 
Pre‐1991; 2008 
No  Pre‐1991 (1 year S)  Pre‐1991 (3 years S);  2008 (1 year S)  Pre‐1991 (3 years );  2008 (1 year ) 
Romania  Pre‐1991 (IB)  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991 (at the discretion of the court); 2009 (2 years)
Slovakia  Pre‐1991 (IB)  No  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991 (at the discretion of the court) 
Slovenia  No  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991  Pre‐1991 (at the discretion of the court) 
Spain  Pre‐1991 
Pre‐1991 (2 years S); 2005 
(0)  Pre‐1991 (5 years S); 2005 (No)  Pre‐1991 (5 years); 2005 (0 years) 
Sweden  No  No  Pre‐1991 (No)  Pre‐1991 (6 months reconsideration period) 
Switzerland  Pre‐1991  2000  Pre‐1991;2000 (4 years S); 2002 (2 years S)  2000 (4 years); 2002 (2 years) 
United 
Kingdom  Pre‐1991 (IB)  No  Pre‐1991  (MC: 2 years S; 5 years S)  Pre‐1991  (5 years) 
Notes: This information is obtained from each national legislation, González and Viitanen (2009), González-Val and Marcén (2012b), the 
Comission on European family Law, the Council of Europe, the European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters 
(http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice), the European e-Justice Portal-Family Matters (https://e-justice.europa.eu). SF: Serious Faults, R: at request, IB: 
Irretrievable Breakdown, MC: with spouse agreement, MB: Marital breakdown (no need of living apart), S: de facto separation (living apart), 
NL: National Legislation (in previous years Russian legislation). 
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Table 7. Divorce Legislation: Divorce process, Spousal Maintenance and Joint Custody 
   Judicial Process (need court order)  JP / 
Spousal Maintenance  Parental Responsabilities 
Country 
Administrative Process AP/ Notary NP  
Principle of guilt; limitation 
Joint custody/ Joint Parenthood Reforms 
Austria  Pre‐1991, JP 
Yes,  (1999) even for the guilty; 3 years 
2001 
Belgium  Pre‐1991, JP 
Yes;   2007 not exceed the marriage duration 
1995, 2006 
Bulgaria  Pre‐1991, JP  Yes; 3 years  . 
Croatia  Pre‐1991, JP  No; (1998)  1 year   2003 
Czech Republic  Pre‐1991, JP  Yes; 3 years  1998 
Denmark  Pre‐1991, JP and AP 
No; 10 years‐3 years (Pre‐1991) depending marriage duration 
2007 
Estonia (NL)  Pre‐1991, JP and AP  No; depending on circumstances  2009 
Finland  Pre‐1991, JP  No, depending on circumstances  . 
France  Pre‐1991, JP 
Yes; depend on the grounds: IB 8 years (2004) 
1993, 2002 
Germany  Pre‐1991, JP  No;  2 years  1997 
Greece  Pre‐1991, JP  No; 3 years  . 
Hungary  Pre‐1991, JP  Yes;  5 years  1995 
Iceland  Pre‐1991, JP  Yes; depending on circumstances  1992, 2006 
Ireland  Pre‐1991, JP  Yes; depending on circumstances  1997 
Italy  Pre‐1991, JP  No; depending on circumstances  2006 
Latvia (NL)  2011 JP, AP and NP  Yes; depending on circumstances  . 
Lithuania (NL)  2000 only JP 
Yes, No support for guilty spouse; 3 years 
. 
Luxembourg  Pre‐1991, JP 
Yes, No support for guilty spouse; depending on circumstances 
. 
Netherlands 
Pre‐1991 JP;  2001  JP and AP 
Yes;  12 years  1998, 2002, 2009 
Norway 
Pre‐1991 AP and  only few cases JP 
Yes;  3 years  . 
Poland  Pre‐1991, JP  Yes, guilty spouse  5 years  . 
Portugal  Pre‐1991, JP and AP 
Yes, guilty spouse in few cases; depending on circumstances 
1995 
Romania 
Pre‐1991, JP; 2010 JP, AP and NP 
Yes, guilty spouse  1 year  2006 
Slovakia  Pre‐1991, JP  No; (2005) 5 years  2010 
Slovenia  Pre‐1991, JP  No; depending on circumstances  2004 
Spain  Pre‐1991, JP  No; depending on circumstances  2005 
Sweden  Pre‐1991, JP  No; depending on circumstances  1998 
Switzerland  Pre‐1991, JP  Yes (Pre‐1991), No (1998); depending on circumstances  2000 
United 
Kingdom  Pre‐1991, JP  No; depending on circumstances, 3 years in Scotland  1989 
Notes: This information is obtained from each national legislation, the Comission on European Family Law, the Council of Europe, European 
Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters (http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice), the European e-Justice Portal-Family Matters (https://e-
justice.europa.eu).  
 33 
Table 8. Divorce rate models, considering divorce laws 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Unemployment rate -0.024**  -0.016**  -0.025**  -0.018**  -0.037***  
 (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.009)  
Male Unemployment rate  -0.022**  -0.015**  -0.024**  -0.018**  -0.037*** 
  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.011) 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.942 0.942 0.976 0.976 0.962 0.962 0.942 0.942 0.960 0.959 
Observations 469 469 528 528 530 530 368 368 456 456 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Crude divorce rate. Robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions are weighted by country population. Ireland data from 1997 
to 2012. Columns (1) and (2) include those countries were couples can easily divorce by mutual consent with a separation or marital breakdown requirement of a year or 
less. Columns (3) and (4) exclude those countries where divorce can easily be granted without the opposition of one of the spouses. Columns (5) and (6) only include 
those countries where divorce needs a court decision. Columns (7) and (8) include those countries where the principle of guilt is not relevant to obtain or to include a 
limitation in the spousal maintenance. Columns (9) and (10) include those countries with reforms on child custody.***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 
5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 9. Divorce rate models, lag specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unemployment rate -0.031***   -0.033*** 
 (0.008)   (0.008) 
Unemployment rate t-1 -0.004   -0.005 
 (0.012)   (0.016) 
Unemployment rate t-2 0.0003   -0.004 
 (0.007)   (0.009) 
Male Unemployment rate  -0.032***   
  (0.009)   
Male Unemployment rate t-1  -0.002   
  (0.008)   
Male Unemployment rate t-2  -0.0004   
  (0.009)   
GDP Per Capita (ln scale)   0.664 0.120 
   (0.701) (0.544) 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (ln scale)   0.004 -0.525 
   (0.409) (0.454) 
GDP Per Capita t-2 (ln scale)   -0.130 -0.415 
   (0.629) (0.809) 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.959 0.959 0.955 0.960 
Observations 576 576 545 545 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Crude divorce rate. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country. All regressions are weighted by country population. Ireland data from 1997 to 
2012. There is no information of the GDP per capita for all the period considered in the 
case of Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. ***Significant at the 
1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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Appendix A 
Figure A1. Average total divorce rate and unemployment rates in Europe 
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Sources: Non-weighted averages for a pool of 28 European countries (without Ireland). 
Data on the Unemployment rate obtained from the World Development Indicators (The 
World Bank). The total divorce rate is calculated as the number of annual divorces per 
1,000 married females. Data on divorces come from Eurostat and United Nations 
Demographic Yearbooks. Information on the number of women who are married is 
obtained from each census, (Source: United Nations Statistics, Census Hub, National 
Statistical Office). We filled the gaps of the number of women who are married by 
linear interpolation.  
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Appendix B 
Table B1. Divorce rate models, OLS estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Unemployment rate -0.324*** -0.115*** -0.015***      -0.128**  
 (0.068) (0.041) (0.005)      (0.048)  
Male Unemployment rate    -0.168* -0.111** -0.014***     
    (0.087) (0.041) (0.005)     
GDP Per Capita (ln scale)       1.671** 2.477 -1.792 0.351 
       (0.632) (1.961) (2.409) (0.274) 
Country fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
Country x Time N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
R2 0.132 0.968 0.976 0.030 0.968 0.976 0.107 0.966 0.968 0.974 
Observations 632 632 632 632 632 632 601 601 601 601 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Total divorce rate in Columns (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), (8) and (9), and the total divorce rate in logarithm in Columns (3), 
(6) and (10). Robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions are weighted by country population. Ireland data from 1997 to 2012. 
There is no information of the GDP per capita for all the period considered in the case of Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. ***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table B2. Divorce rate models, considering political and institutional changes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Unemployment rate -0.114**  -0.117**  -0.113**  -0.124**  -0.123**  
 (0.045)  (0.049)  (0.042)  (0.045)  (0.046)  
Male Unemployment rate  -0.111**  -0.115**  -0.109**  -0.119**  -0.117** 
  (0.046)  (0.050)  (0.042)  (0.044)  (0.046) 
EU member     0.513 0.481   0.532 0.497 
     (0.447) (0.467)   (0.441) (0.462) 
Adopted Euro       -0.472 -0.441 -0.491 -0.456 
       (0.427) (0.409) (0.422) (0.404) 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.968 0.968 0.969 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 
Observations 588 588 478 478 632 632 632 632 632 632 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Total divorce rate. Robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions are weighted by country population. 
Ireland data from 1997 to 2012. Columns (1) and (2) do not include the observations of the Upper-middle-income economies (Bulgaria and 
Romania) following the classification of the World Bank. In Columns (3) and (4) the observations from the countries that obtain the 
independence of another country (Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia) are excluded from the sample. 
***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table B3. Divorce rate models: Adding controls for Age, FLFP and Religion 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Unemployment rate -0.111*** -0.114*** -0.111*** -0.115*** -0.111***   
 (0.035) (0.040) (0.035) (0.041) (0.035)   
Male Unemployment rate      -0.109*** -0.109***
      (0.034) (0.034) 
Median Age -0.788  -0.736  -0.736 -0.808 -0.808 
 (0.760)  (0.703)  (0.703) (0.729) (0.729) 
FLFP  0.059 0.037  0.037 0.029 0.029 
  (0.077) (0.054)  (0.054) (0.052) (0.052) 
Catholic    -19.503*** 1.948  2.154 
    (0.056) (4.597)  (4.685) 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 
Observations 622 632 622 632 622 622 622 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Total divorce rate. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country. All regressions are weighted by country population. Ireland data from 1997 to 
2012. The median age is only available since 2001 in the case of Croatia. Countries are 
classified as Catholic if in that country the majority of individuals are Catholics 
following the classification of the World Factbook of the CIA. ***Significant at the 1% 
level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table B4. Divorce rate models: Adding cash benefits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Unemployment rate -0.105**  -0.104**  -0.105**  
 (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.046)  
Male Unemployment rate  -0.104*  -0.103*  -0.104** 
  (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.049) 
% Cash Benefits  -0.012 -0.009     
 (0.266) (0.266)     
Cash Benefits per head   -0.102 -0.077   
   (0.264) (0.278)   
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970 
Observations 480 480 480 480 480 480 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Total divorce rate. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country. All regressions are weighted by country population. Ireland data from 1997 to 
2012. Data on Public Cash Benefits for unemployed individuals is obtained from the 
OECD dataset. Columns (1) and (2) include the cash benefits measured in percentage of 
the GDP. In columns (3) and (4), cash benefits are calculated per head, at constant 
prices, in 2005 US dollars. ***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, 
*significant at the 10% level. 
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Table B5. Divorce rate models, considering divorce laws 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Unemployment rate -0.103**  -0.069**  -0.111**  -0.080**  -0.168***  
 (0.039)  (0.031)  (0.043)  (0.037)  (0.043)  
Male Unemployment rate  -0.092**  -0.067**  -0.107**  -0.077**  -0.164*** 
  (0.033)  (0.027)  (0.042)  (0.032)  (0.049) 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.959 0.958 0.980 0.980 0.969 0.968 0.954 0.954 0.967 0.967 
Observations 469 469 528 528 530 530 368 368 456 456 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Total divorce rate. Robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions are weighted by country population. 
Ireland data from 1997 to 2012. Columns (1) and (2) include those countries were couples can easily divorce by mutual consent with a separation 
or marital breakdown requirement of a year or less. Columns (3) and (4) exclude those countries where divorce can easily be granted without the 
opposition of one of the spouses. Columns (5) and (6) only include those countries where divorce needs a court decision. Columns (7) and (8) 
include those countries where the principle of guilt is not relevant to obtain or to include a limitation in the spousal maintenance. Columns (9) 
and (10) include those countries with reforms on child custody.***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 
10% level. 
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Table B6. Divorce rate models, lag specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unemployment rate -0.139***   -0.147*** 
 (0.038)   (0.037) 
Unemployment rate t-1 -0.014   -0.020 
 (0.057)   (0.072) 
Unemployment rate t-2 -0.009   -0.033 
 (0.035)   (0.043) 
Male Unemployment rate  -0.143***   
  (0.043)   
Male Unemployment rate t-1  -0.007   
  (0.038)   
Male Unemployment rate t-2  -0.010   
  (0.043)   
GDP Per Capita (ln scale)   2.668 0.221 
   (3.246) (2.376) 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (ln scale)   0.063 -2.286 
   (1.812) (2.065) 
GDP Per Capita t-2 (ln scale)   -0.895 -2.656 
   (2.769) (3.920) 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.967 0.967 0.964 0.968 
Observations 576 576 545 545 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Total divorce rate. All Robust standard errors clustered by 
country. All regressions are weighted by country population. Ireland data from 1997 to 
2012. There is no information of the GDP per capita for all the period considered in the 
case of Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. ***Significant at the 
1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
